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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 930436-CA

DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft of lost, mislaid
or mistakenly

delivered property, a third degree

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (1990) .

felony, in

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to
dismiss for cause a juror who was related by marriage to a
prosecution witness?
Where counsel for the defense challenges a juror for cause,
the decision to remove the juror is within the sound discretion of
the trial court.

State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah

1989); accord State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah App.
1992) .
2.

Was the evidence adduced by the State sufficient to
1

support the jury's verdict of guilty?
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient
evidence when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable

that

'reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained

reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime."

a

State

v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Petree,
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)).
3.

Did

sentencing

the

trial

defendant

court

without

exercise

a

proper

presentence

discretion

report

where:

by
a)

defendant absconded from the jurisdiction soon after the court
ordered a presentence report; and, 2) defendant, after returning
under an extradition order, stated through his attorney that he
wanted no further delays in his sentencing?
An appellate court "does not disturb a sentence unless it
exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused
its discretion."

State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986).

"An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of the judge
in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a
'clearly excessive sentence."

State v. Russell, 791 P. 2d 188, 192-

93 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407, governing theft of lost, mislaid,
or mistakenly delivered property, provides:
A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another which he
knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have
been delivered under a mistake as to the
2

identity of the recipient or as to the nature
or amount of the property, without taking
reasonable measures to return it to the owner;
and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner
of the property when he obtains the property
or at any time prior to taking the measures
designated in paragraph (1).
Rule 18(e) (4) and (14), governing selection of jury, provides:
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of
the following grounds:
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship
between the prospective juror and any
party, witness or person alleged to have
been victimized or injured by the
defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable
minds that the prospective juror would be
unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism.
A
prospective
juror
shall
not
be
disqualified
solely because
he is
indebted to or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof. . ..

(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the
cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial
rights of the party challenging. • ..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of theft of lost, mislaid
or mistakenly delivered property for appropriating a set of golf
clubs, which he later passed on to another individual (R. 1-2) .
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 97) .
He subsequently failed to contact Adult Probation and Parole for
purposes of preparing a presentence report, as ordered by the

3

court, and left the jurisdiction (Tr. of 1/25/93 at 160; Tr. of
2/24/93

at

3-4) .

Ultimately,

defendant

returned

to

the

jurisdiction under an extradition order, at which time he was
sentenced to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (Tr. of
6/16/93 at 2, 6; R. 105-06).

This timely appeal followed (R. 108-

09) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After returning from a Moab High School golf team trip, Derek
Daye walked over to City Market and left his set of golf clubs in
front of the store while he went inside to call his father for a
ride home (Tr. of January 25, 1993 at 51-52) .x When he returned,
the golf clubs were gone (Tr. 53) .

Derek testified that he saw

defendant near the high school when he arrived back from the golf
club trip and then, again, by the market before he went in to make
the telephone call (Tr. 56).
Defendant, who had been "living on the river all summer, "
testified that he found the set of golf clubs in a ditch or creek
behind the high school and that the glare of the clubs sticking out
of a plastic garbage bag caught his eye (Tr. 114, 116-17, 123) . He
assumed the clubs were discarded, stating, "I didn't figure no one
would be interested in some trash laying in the ditch" (R. 117).
According to defendant, he left the clubs there, returning to get
them a few days later after he had told an acquaintance who golfed
where the clubs were and that individual, Billy Williams, was
1

Hereafter, the trial transcript, dated January 25, 1993,
will be referred to as "Tr.". Any other referenced transcript will
include the date of the proceeding as an identifier.
4

unable to locate them (Tr. 115) .

Defendant then put the clubs

under Williams' trailer, and Williams later offered defendant $20
for the set (Tr. 115-16) .
Billy Williams testified that defendant told him he found the
clubs by the creek, that defendant offered to sell the set for $50,
that defendant left the clubs under the trailer for his inspection,
and that he paid defendant $25 for the set (Tr. 67, 69).
The clubs were ultimately recovered while Billy Williams was
playing golf at the Moab golf course (Tr. 90, 96). Williams had
broken a club and thrown it away (Tr. 72) . A range boy recognized
it as one of Derek Daye's stolen clubs, retrieved it, and turned it
over to Glen Richeson, the course golf pro (Tr. 90) . The sheriff's
department was called in, and the clubs were recovered from Billy
Williams (Tr. 90, 96).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss juror
Hopper for cause.

First, defendant has made an understandable

error in reading the transcript, mistakenly thinking the voir dire
of

juror

Hopper

ended

in

an

equivocal

response

impartiality, thus raising an inference of bias.

about

his

The amended

transcript, however, clearly establishes both that the voir dire of
Hopper ended sooner than defense counsel thought and that Hopper
definitively expressed that he could independently assess the
testimony. See Addendum A. Second, defendant waived any objection
to juror Hopper's presence on the jury by failing to remove him
with a peremptory challenge, instead using his peremptories on

5

jurors against whom there had been no for-cause challenges.

To

claim error on appeal based on a juror whose presence defendant
tacitly ratified is an inconsistency raising the spectre of invited
error.

Such a claim must fail.

Defendant's

second

argument,

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient to support the jury verdict, fails for two reasons.
First, the victim's inability to identify defendant from a photo
array was not dispositive as to any elements of the crime for which
defendant was found guilty.

And second, even if the victim's

inability to identify defendant from the photo array rendered his
testimony suspect, that does not necessarily mean that the jury
would have believed defendant's version of the events and acquitted
him.
Defendant's final argument, that the trial court abused its
discretion by sentencing him without a presentence report, is also
without merit.
trial,

Defendant fled the jurisdiction immediately after

thus precluding

preparation

of

a presentence

report.

Furthermore, after extradition back to Utah, he stated through his
attorney that he wanted to be sentenced right away.

Under such

circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion in
acting as it did.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS JUROR
HOPPER FOR CAUSE DID NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE
ERROR
During voir dire, the court asked the venire as a whole: "Is
6

there anyone that -- that is on this potential jury panel that has
either a personal or a friendly relationship with either the -either counsel here, the defendant, or the witnesses in the way of
a social relationship, I guess?"

(Tr. 26) .

Ray Dean Hopper

responded that his daughter was married to the son of witness Glen
Richeson, the golf pro at the Moab golf course.

The court then

questioned Hopper in order to establish whether he would give
Richeson's testimony undue weight. Hopper indicated that he would
not

(Tr. 27).

Subsequently, defense counsel challenged juror

Hopper for cause, "based on his relationship, Mr. Richeson's son
and his daughter" (Tr. 30).

The court ruled against defendant.

(Tr. 31) . The parties then exercised their peremptory challenges.
Although defendant exhausted her challenges, she chose not to
strike juror Hopper (R. 96).
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to either remove juror Hopper for cause
or fully question him to rebut what defendant claims was an
inference of bias.

Furthermore, he argues that even if he had not

used all of his peremptory challenges on other jurors, he would
have been prejudiced by having to exercise a peremptory to remove
a juror who should have been removed for cause (Br. of App. at 8) .
Defendant's claim fails for two reasons, one factual and one
legal.

First, defendant has misread the record, basing his

argument on the factually incorrect belief that juror Hopper's
concluding statement as to whether he could fairly judge all of the
testimony was: "I -- I guess not, probably not" (Br. of App. at 4
7

(citing Tr. 28)) . Defendant uses this statement to argue that the
inference of bias raised by the relationship between the juror's
daughter and the witness's son had not been dispelled: "In the
instant

case, after

the

Court's

inquiry

was

completed,

the

challenged juror, far from being rehabilitated allowed as to how he
could

probably

not

judge

all

of

the

testimony

presented

impartially" (Br. of App. at 7-8).
Defendant's argument is based on a mistaken reading of the
record. He has confused the subsequent voir dire of a female juror
with the earlier voir dire of juror Hopper.

Because many jurors

were labelled simply as "unidentified juror" in the original voir
dire transcript, defendant's mistake is understandable.

The

supplemental

the

confusion.

transcript,

however,

unequivocally

resolves

See Addendum A.

During voir dire, after the court asked if anyone had a social
or personal relationship with defendant, either counsel, or any of
the witnesses, the court and juror Hopper engaged in the following
interchange, reproduced here in its entirety:
Juror:

Mr. Glen Richeson, I know. My son and his
daughter are married. I know them quite well.

The Court:

Does -- but does the relationship that you
have with him, would it -- would it make you
tend to believe him, his testimony as opposed
to the testimony of someone else here?
Unfairly. You know, I mean without --

Juror:

I don't know --

The Court:

I mean, if you didn't believe him, could you
go ahead and decide the case on the basis of
not believing his testimony and proceed?

Juror:

No.
8

The Court:

You think that the fact of that relationship
that you have with him and through your
families is — is such that you would just
tend to have to believe his testimony as
opposed to testimony that might be
controvert his testimony; is that correct?

Juror:

Well, no, I don't believe it would make any
difference.

The Court:

You don't think it would make any difference?
You'd just listen to the testimony and make up
your own mind on the basis of the testimony
and/or the conflicts in the testimony?

Juror:

Yes.

The Court:

Okay.

(Tr. 27) .

This exchange was plainly intended to explore whether

juror Hopper would accord undue weight to Glen Richeson's testimony
and whether he could judge all of the testimony impartially.
Admittedly, the court's questioning begins somewhat unartfully.
Its second question is marked by a perplexing double negative, and
juror Hopper's answer, in the context of the entire exchange,
indicates that he may well have been confused by the court's
wording of its inquiry.
court expresses

As the conversation continues and the

itself more plainly, however, juror Hopper's

responses become increasingly unequivocal.

At the end of the

exchange, both parties seem clear that Hopper will independently
assess the testimony.

Under the circumstances, the court was

within its discretion in seating the juror because any inference of
bias stemming from his relationship with Glen Richeson had been

9

rebutted.2
Second, in any event, defendant's claim must fail because he
is legally incorrect in asserting that "' it is prejudicial error to
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a jury
panel member who should have been removed for cause. ' " Br. of App.
at 8 (quoting State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App. 1992)
(citation omitted)).

Under the line of cases that developed from

Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091
defendant
automatic.

relies,

prejudice

was

(Utah 1975), and on which

presumed

and

reversal

was

State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 1994).

Defendant, however, has ignored the Utah Supreme Court's recent
holding that " [t]o prevail on a claim of error based on the failure
to

remove

a

juror

prejudice, viz.,
incompetent."

for

cause, a defendant

must

demonstrate

show that a member of the jury was partial or
Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at

24

(citation

omitted).
The claim in Menzies involved several jurors who were removed
by peremptory challenge after the trial court refused to remove
them for cause.

Defendant argued that forcing defense counsel to

use peremptories in this manner constituted reversible error. Id.
Defendant's claim failed because he relied on the old automatic
reversal rule and did not carry his burden of demonstrating how the

2

As matters evolved, Glen Richeson testified only as to the
value of the golf clubs (Tr. 89-94) . He did not testify about the
substantive elements of the crime with which defendant was charged.
See State v. Lacev, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983) (court notes that
witnesses with whom juror had relationship did not offer testimony
crucial to State's case nor was their credibility questioned).
10

forced use of his peremptory challenges rendered the jury partial
or biased.

Id. at 26.

The instant case differs from Menzies in that defendant chose
not to remove juror Hopper with a peremptory challenge, instead
using her peremptories on other jurors and allowing juror Hopper to
be seated.

Juror Hopper was not forced on defendant.3

Under such circumstances, counsel's course of action should be
held on appeal to operate as a waiver of any objection to Hopper's
presence on the jury.

The United States Supreme Court, in

approving such a rule, has stated:
[A]lthough
Oklahoma provides
a capital
defendant with nine peremptory challenges,
this grant is qualified by the requirement
that the defendant must use those challenges
to cure erroneous refusals by the trial court
to excuse jurors for cause. We think there is
nothing arbitrary or irrational about such a
requirement, which subordinates the absolute
freedom to use a peremptory challenge as one
wishes to the goal of empaneling an impartial
jury.
Ross v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 81, 90 (1988).

This "cure it or waive

it" rule, although not specifically addressed in Menzies because
the jurors were removed by peremptory challenge, follows naturally
from it and other settled precedent.
To claim error on appeal based on a juror whose presence on
the jury defendant tacitly approved is an inconsistency that
"smacks of invited error, which is 'procedurally unjustified and

3

Indeed, juror Hopper was the sole juror challenged for
cause by defense counsel. Thus, defendant could have allowed any
of the other jurors whom she challenged peremptorily to sit,
without thereby creating a partial jury.
11

viewed with disfavor.'11 Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah
1994), petition for cert, filed, (U.S. Jul. 18, 1994) (No. 945235), citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987).
Under such circumstances, defendant's claim must fail.
POINT TWO
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE STATE WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT OF
GUILTY
A criminal conviction will only be reversed for insufficient
evidence when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable

that

'reasonable

minds

must

have

entertained

reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the crime."

a

State

v. Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543 (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d at
444) .

Defendant asserts that the inability of Derek Daye, the

victim, to identify defendant in a photo array as the man he had
seen by the high school and at City Market on the evening the golf
clubs

were

taken

rendered

his

subsequent

defendant at trial "inherently improbable."

identification

of

Defendant summarily

concludes that absent Derek's unbelievable testimony, the jury
would probably have believed defendant's testimony and found him
not guilty (Br. of App. at 12) .
This argument also fails for two reasons. First, Derek Daye's
identification of defendant as someone who was in the area when the
clubs were taken was not the linchpin of the case.

The statute

governing theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property
requires that a person "obtains property of another which he knows
to have been lost or mislaid. . .."
12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407(1)

(1992).

There was no factual dispute about defendant "obtaining"

the property. Indeed, defendant himself admitted that he found the
golf clubs in a ditch and later retrieved them (Tr. 114, 118) . All
the jury had to believe of Derek's testimony was that when he
returned from telephoning his father, the golf clubs were gone.
Derek Daye's inability to identify defendant from a photo array is
not dispositive as to any of the elements of the crime for which
the jury found defendant guilty.
Second, even if Derek's inability to identify defendant from
the photo array rendered his testimony suspect, that does not
necessarily mean that the jury would have believed defendant's
version of the events.

Derek and defendant were not the only

witnesses to testify at trial. Derek's father, two law enforcement
officers, the golf pro, Billy Williams, and a neighbor of Williams'
also testified. The testimony of these witnesses was consistent in
establishing that: defendant obtained the set of golf clubs that
Derek Daye lost (Tr. 101, 110); defendant sold the clubs to Billy
Williams, who thought they might be "hot" (Tr. 67-69, 107-08); a
range boy at the Moab golf course found a broken club that he
believed was one of Derek's (Tr. 90); the golf pro called the
police (Tr. 90) ; the police recovered the clubs from Billy Williams
on the Moab golf course (Tr. 90, 96).
With these facts in mind, the question for the jury was
whether defendant, when he obtained the clubs, knew they had been
lost or mislaid and "had the purpose to deprive the owner of the

13

property."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407 (2) .4

While defendant

testified that he thought the clubs were "trash," his subsequent
action of delivering them to a golfer acquaintance, whether as a
sale or a gift, flies in the face of his earlier assessment of them
as worthless (Tr. 117-19).

A jury could reasonably infer from

defendant's action that he knew the clubs had been lost or mislaid.
An equally reasonable inference is that, by delivering the clubs to
another party who did not own them, he demonstrated an intent "to
deprive the owner of the property."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-407(2) .

It is, of course, the jury's prerogative both to assess the
credibility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony.
v. Martinez, 709 P.2d 355, 356 (Utah 1985).

State

It is not defense

counsel's role, and it is not this Court's role. Certainly, if the
jury had believed defendant's version of events and disbelieved all
the other witnesses, it could have acquitted him.

But the jury

chose not to do so, and defendant has not shown how the evidence
and

inferences

that

may properly

be

drawn

from

it

are

so

"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."
443, 444 (Utah 1983).

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d

Under such circumstances, this Court should

not disturb the jury's decision. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738
(Utah App. 1990).

Accord State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah

4

As to the other statutory elements of the crime,
defendant's testimony clearly established that he obtained the
property of another (R. 114) and that he made no attempt to return
the property to the owner (R. 117-20) . See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6407.
14

1985).
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT WITHOUT A PRESENTENCE
REPORT
WHERE
DEFENDANT:
1)
FLED
THE
JURISDICTION AFTER TRIAL, THUS PRECLUDING THE
PREPARATION OF A PRESENTENCE REPORT; AND 2)
STATED
THROUGH
HIS
ATTORNEY,
AFTER
EXTRADITION, THAT HE WANTED TO BE SENTENCED
RIGHT AWAY
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him because, while the court initially agreed that a
presentence report would be appropriate, it eventually sentenced
him without the benefit of that document.

In essence, he argues

that the court's "rescission" of its order constituted an abuse of
discretion (Br. of App. at 13).
Defendant, however, has failed to consider the intervening
events between the initial order for a presentence report and the
eventual sentence.

On the date set for sentencing, defendant

failed to appear.

His counsel reported that he had left the

jurisdiction immediately after trial and was at the Open Door
Mission in Omaha, Nebraska. She recommended that he be allowed to
continue in that year-long program, reasoning: "I'm sure that if he
finds out now that he's being extradited and probably going to
prison, he's going to flee that program" (Tr. of February 24, 1992
hearing at 2).

She later added: " [I]f he knows they're coming to

get him to take him to prison, he's probably going to move" (Id. at
3) .

She also argued that, while defendant did know that he was

supposed to appear for sentencing, he may not have known he was
supposed to contact Adult Probation and Parole for presentence
15

report purposes (Id. at 4-5) .

She admitted, however, that the

reason defendant may not have known about his obligation to contact
Adult Probation and Parole was that he had fled the jurisdiction
(Id. at 4) .
Defendant was eventually extradited back to Utah, where he
appeared in court for sentencing.

After urging the court to once

again

Probation

refer

the

case

to Adult

and

presentence report, defense counsel engaged

Parole

for a

in the following

exchange with the court:
D. Counsel:

Then I had hoped that while he was
awaiting extradition, that Mr. Thayne
would conduct presentence report [sic],
and that was my understanding, so I was
surprised to find out that one had not
been done, I believe that would have been
helpful; however, Mr. Schultz feels that
if you are going to send him to prison,
you know, regardless --

The Court:

Better now than later, huh?

D. Counsel:

-- he'd like to get going.

(Tr. of June 16, 1993 hearing at 3.)

Prior to imposing sentence,

and after the prosecution had recommended immediate commitment to
prison, the court

stated:

"Well, that's my

Schultz, under these circumstances.

inclination, Mr.

If there's —

if there's an

attitude of cooperation shown, the Court generally wants to hear
all sides, but where -- where you have left the area after trial
and conviction by a jury, I'm going to -- impose the statutory -[sic]11 (Id. at 3-4) .5

The court then sentenced defendant to zero

5

At this juncture, counsel argued that defendant tried to
stay in contact with the court through a Nebraska attorney after he
left Utah (Tr. of February 24, 1993 hearing at 4-5) . However,
16

to five years in the Utah State Prison (Id. at 6).
In order for the court's sentencing decision emerging from
this fact pattern to constitute an abuse of discretion, defendant
must show that the sentence was either clearly excessive or
inherently unfair.

Russell, 791 P.2d at 192-93.

Counsel has

conceded that the sentence was within legal limits, arguing only
that "[t]he reason that such revocation is arbitrary and reversible
is because it is based on emotion and contempt for Defendant rather
than on the basis of a prepared report" (Br. of App. at 13). The
court, however, made clear that it based its decision to forego the
presentence report on defendant's voluntary act of absconding from
the jurisdiction following conviction.

Furthermore, the statute

governing presentence investigation reports states: "Prior to the
imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections
or information from other sources about the defendant." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1 (4) (a) (1990) (emphasis added).
defendant

had been extradited back

In this case, after

to Utah, counsel clearly

represented that her client did not concur in any action that would
further delay his sentencing.
Defendant's flouting of judicial process, coupled with the
expressed desire to move along to the sentencing after he was

counsel never addressed the primary focus of the court's concern -defendant's prior act of fleeing the jurisdiction.
17

extradited, constituted a reasonable and adequate basis for the
court's decision.

Because defendant has failed to show that the

sentence was inherently unfair, the determination of the trial
court should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
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ADDENDUM A

1

of the witnesses.

I know that Ms. Nelson mentioned that she

2

was neighbors of the Dayes.

3

there are any friendships or acquaintances that might affect

4

them, either with counsel or with witnesses.
THE COURT:

5

I think we need to find out if

Well, I thought that I had tried to do

6

that with the preliminary statements and questions that I made.

7

Is there anyone that--that is on this potential jury

8

panel that has either a personal or a friendly relationship

9

with either the--either counsel here, the defendant, or the

10

witnesses in the way of a social relationship, I guess?

11

Let's start here with--

12

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

I'm a student of--or rather,

13

Derek Daye's a student of I've known Mr. Richeson for about ten

14

years.

15

THE COURT:

Yes?

16

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

17

which Ms. Starley also is a member of.

I'm a member of the Rotary Club

16

MS. STARLEY:

19

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

20

THE COURT:

21

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE) : Mr. Glen Richeson, I know.

22

Or will be.

Let's--

My son and his daughter are married.
THE COURT:

23
24

Or will be, today.

I know them quite well.

Does--but does the relationship that you

have with him, would it--would it make you tend to believe him,

I
his testimony as opposed to the testimony of someone else here?
25
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1

Unfairly.

You know, I mean without-

2

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE):

3

THE COURT:

I don't know-

I mean, if you didn't believe him, could

4

you 9° ahead and decide the case on the basis of not believing

5

his testimony and proceed?

6

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): No.

7

THE COURT:

You think

that

the fact

of that

9

relationship that you have with him and through your families

9 I

is--is such that you would just tend to have to believe his

20 |

testimony as opposed to testimony that might be--controvert his

22 I

testimony; is that correct?

12

23
14
15
16
17
16
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): Well, no, I don't believe

it would make any difference.
THE COURT:
difference?

You don't

think

it would make any

You'd just listen to the testimony and make up

your own mind on the basis of the testimony

and/or the

conflicts in the testimony?
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR (MALE): Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR

Yes?
(FEMALE): I've known Glen for

about eight, nine years, too. We've kind of worked together at
the hospital and stuff, and it might--honestly, it might make
a difference 'cause I think he's a real, fair, honest person,
so see, it might make a difference to me, what he says.

I

don't know. Honestly I don't know, but it's a good possibility.
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